Start here
The Stoic principles, in plain English
The short answer
The basics of Stoicism come down to a few connected ideas: some things are up to us and some are not; we are disturbed more by our judgments than by events; character is the only true good; and every person belongs to one human community. Here are all seventeen principles, each with its source and a practice.
In this guide · 8 sections
These are the seventeen principles the Stoic Practice app is built on, and each of its 365 days is tagged with one of them. The list is our arrangement, not an ancient one. The Stoics taught philosophy in three parts, logic, physics and ethics, and nearly everything here belongs to the ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). But every principle comes from the surviving texts. The sections below show the passages they rest on, in public-domain translations, and say plainly when a label is modern.
The principles in one minute
- Dichotomy of control. Some things are up to you and most are not. Put your effort where it counts.
- Objective judgment. Events arrive with a verdict attached. The verdict is yours to examine.
- Inner freedom. No one can force your judgment or make your choices for you.
- Virtue is the only good. Character is what makes a life good. Health, money and reputation are worth preferring, but they are not good in themselves.
- Wisdom. Knowing what actually matters, and what the situation in front of you calls for.
- Courage. Holding to what is right through fear, pain and disapproval.
- Justice. Fairness, honesty and goodwill toward everyone, strangers included.
- Temperance. Right measure in pleasure, desire, speech and possessions.
- Shared humanity. Every person shares in reason, so all people belong to one community.
- Roles and duties. Your relationships tell you what is yours to do.
- The present moment. Now is the only time you can live in or act in.
- Change and impermanence. Everything changes, including what you love and you yourself.
- Memento mori. Remembering death keeps your priorities honest.
- Amor fati. Wish for things to happen as they do, and act well in what follows.
- Living according to nature. Live as a reasoning, social being, and as part of a larger whole.
- Self-examination. Review your own conduct honestly, without punishing yourself.
- Practice and progress. Character is built by repeated action, not by reading.
Read in order, they make one argument. If the only things fully up to you are your judgments and choices (1 to 3), then the good of your life has to lie there, in your character (4 to 8). Character shows in how you deal with other people (9 and 10) and in how you use the time you have (11 to 14). Taken together, that is what the Stoics meant by living according to nature (15). The last two principles are how you get better at all of it.
Control and judgment
Three principles about what is yours. They are where Epictetus starts, and where most people who take up Stoicism start too.
Dichotomy of control
Epictetus’s Enchiridion, the short handbook of his teaching compiled by his student Arrian, opens by dividing everything into two kinds.
Of things some are in our power, and others are not. … Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint or hindrance; but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others.
The lines skipped in this excerpt name what is in our power: opinion, the impulse to act, desire and aversion, in a word our own acts (Enchiridion 1). The other list covers most of what people worry about: the body, property, reputation and office, meaning position. Before a job interview, your preparation, your honesty and how you speak to the receptionist are on the first list. Whether they hire you is on the second. You can care about the outcome and still refuse to stake your peace on it.
“Dichotomy of control” is a modern name for this division; Epictetus doesn’t use the phrase. The dichotomy of control guide covers the idea in depth and has a free exercise for sorting a real problem.
Objective judgment
Something happens, and an impression arrives with it, verdict included: he insulted me, this ruins everything. The Stoics called accepting that verdict assent and treated it as a step of its own. The impression shows up whether you want it or not. Whether you sign off on it is up to you. Marcus Aurelius locates harm in exactly that place.
What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of another; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form [such] opinions, and all is well. … let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to nature.
The entry makes two moves. First, harm “does not subsist in the ruling principle of another” (Meditations 4.39): what someone else thinks of you happens in their mind, not in yours. Second, a test. Whatever “can happen equally to the bad man and the good” (Meditations 4.39) can’t decide whether a life goes well. A layoff or a canceled flight lands on decent people and scoundrels alike.
In practice this means describing events before judging them. A friend hasn’t answered your message in two days. The fact is that no reply has come. “She’s annoyed with me” is something you added, and you may be wrong. Epictetus gave the idea its best-known form in Enchiridion 5: people are troubled not by things but by their opinions about things.
Inner freedom
Epictetus was enslaved for part of his life (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)), and freedom is one of his constant subjects. The long discourse that George Long titles “About Freedom” (Discourses 4.1) argues that the free person is the one who can’t be compelled. Marcus, an emperor, wrote the image many readers remember:
Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and deliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is unhappy.
A citadel is the walled stronghold at the top of a city, the part that holds after the rest has fallen. Marcus’s claim is narrow, and that is its strength. Other people can make your life hard. They can’t make you agree that something is shameful, or choose your answer for you.
Suppose a manager pushes you to sign off on figures you think are wrong. He controls your bonus, maybe your job. Whether your name goes on the report is still your decision. The pressure is real, but it has to pass through your judgment. Marcus thinks even plain obstinacy can hold that ground, and a mind that judges “aided by reason and deliberately” (Meditations 8.48) holds it far better. That is why the Stoics trained judgment.
The good: virtue and the four virtues
Virtue is the only good
This is the most demanding Stoic claim, and the one most often misread. The Stoics held that only virtue, meaning excellence of character, is good, and only vice is bad. Everything else, including health, wealth, reputation and even life itself, they called indifferent (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). Seneca tries out several ways of saying it:
Thus, it will come to the same thing, if I say “The highest good is a mind which despises the accidents of fortune, and takes pleasure in virtue”: … Or we may choose to define it by calling that man happy who knows good and bad only in the form of good or bad minds: who worships honour, and is satisfied with his own virtue, who is neither puffed up by good fortune nor cast down by evil fortune, who knows no other good than that which he is able to bestow upon himself, whose real pleasure lies in despising pleasures.
Look near the end of the passage: the good is the one “which he is able to bestow upon himself” (On the Happy Life 4). Character is the one good nobody else has to hand you and nobody can take. Marcus’s test from 4.39, above, comes at the same point from the other side.
Indifferent does not mean unimportant. The mainstream Stoic view was that health, money and a good name are preferred: it is natural and right to choose them over sickness, poverty and disgrace, and to work for them sensibly. They just don’t decide whether you live well. In English they are usually called preferred indifferents, from the Greek proēgmena. A rich, healthy person can live badly, and a sick, poor one can live well.
Epictetus thought the doctrine was easy to recite and hard to hold:
For now who among us is not able to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things (in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the indifferent are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed.
The gap he points to is between the lecture and the laugh. You can explain that reputation is indifferent and still burn when someone mocks you. Closing that gap is the work of the last section on this page.
Wisdom, courage, justice and temperance
The Stoics kept the four main virtues Plato had named in the Republic and treated each as a kind of knowledge. Courage, for instance, is knowing what should be endured and what should be feared. Wisdom is knowing what is good, what is bad and what is neither. Justice governs what we owe other people, all of them and not only friends. Temperance keeps appetite, speech and possessions in proportion.
Because all four rest on the same knowledge, the Stoics held that they can’t be separated: whoever truly has one has them all (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). In practice they work less like four ideals than like four questions to put to one decision. The four virtues guide covers each one, with Marcus’s own lists and a free exercise.
Living with others
Shared humanity
Marcus builds this principle as a chain of ifs.
If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state.
If people share reason, they share a law; if they share a law, they are fellow citizens; and so the world is “in a manner a state” (Meditations 4.4). Scholars call this Stoic cosmopolitanism, from the Greek for a citizen of the world. It means justice doesn’t stop at your family, your country or the people you like.
It also changes how you meet the people who annoy you. The customer who was rude on the phone and the driver who cut you off belong, on Marcus’s view, to the same city you do. That doesn’t mean approving of what they did. It means your answer starts from kinship, which rules out contempt. For the hard cases, see difficult people.
Roles and duties
Epictetus offers a plain method for working out what to do: look at the names you carry.
Consider who you are. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to it … Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it … After this, remember that you are a son. … After this know that you are a brother also … Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember that you are a senator; if a youth, that you are a youth; if an old man, that you are an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties.
Each of your names, he says, “marks out the proper duties” (Discourses 2.10). The Stoics’ technical term for these was kathēkonta, usually translated “appropriate actions” or “proper functions”: what it is fitting for someone in your position to do. Epictetus says elsewhere that they are measured by our relationships (Enchiridion 30), and the glossary has more on the term. Notice the order. Before son, brother or senator comes human being, whose highest power is what Long translates as “the will”: the faculty of choice. Next comes citizen of the world.
The question turns vague good intentions into something you can act on. Before a hard conversation with your teenage son, ask what being his parent asks of you here, not what would win the argument. Before you answer a sharp email from your brother, remember that you are writing as his sibling, not as the person who was right about the holiday plans.
Living in time
The present moment
Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and besides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time, which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives; and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a succession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.
Marcus reminds himself that “every man lives only this present time, which is an indivisible point” (Meditations 3.10). The past is finished and the future is uncertain, so the present is the only place where anything can be done. In Meditations 2.14 he makes a related point: the present is the only thing anyone can lose, since no one can be robbed of a past or future he doesn’t have.
This is not a slogan about savoring the moment. Marcus pairs it with the shortness of life and the smallness of fame, and the point is practical: the task in front of you is the one you can do well. When your mind is three weeks ahead, rehearsing a conversation that may never happen, the principle sends it back to today’s work. For more on that pattern, see worry.
Change and impermanence
Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without change? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal nature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? and canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature?
Marcus’s examples are domestic. There is no hot bath unless the wood burns, and no meal unless the food is transformed. You depend on change every hour and resent it mainly when it happens to you or to what you love. His conclusion is that your own changes belong to the same process that makes everything else possible, and elsewhere he counts growing old and dying among them (Meditations 9.3).
Seeing change as the ordinary condition of things doesn’t make losses painless. It does mean they arrive as part of how the world works, not as an outrage. A child leaves home, a team is reorganized, a parent grows frail: each is a change you can meet. The Stoics also rehearsed such changes in advance (Enchiridion 3 is one example); that practice now goes by the modern name negative visualization. For loss itself, see grief.
Memento mori
Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly.
Marcus uses death here as a deadline on his character, not as a gloomy thought. The entry reads like a progress report: he will die soon, and he is still not simple, not calm, not kind to everyone. Death makes the unfinished list urgent. Memento mori, Latin for “remember that you will die,” is a later traditional label. The Stoics practiced the thought without the slogan. The memento mori guide covers the practice, and the memento mori calendar shows a life in weeks.
Amor fati
Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave, justly to those who are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without being well examined.
Amor fati, “love of fate,” is the phrase of the nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, not of any ancient Stoic. The attitude it names is older. Epictetus advises wishing for things to happen as they actually happen, not as you would like them to (Enchiridion 8, in our words). Marcus’s version says it is always in your power “piously to acquiesce in thy present condition” (Meditations 7.54).
Notice what else is in that sentence. In the same breath Marcus asks himself to deal justly with the people around him and to examine every thought that comes in. Acceptance, on this reading, is where acting well begins, not where it stops. The amor fati guide goes further.
Living according to nature
This was the Stoics’ own formula for the goal of life. The school’s founder, Zeno, or his successor Cleanthes (the sources differ), defined that goal as living in agreement with nature (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). “Nature” had two senses. One is the order of the whole world, which the Stoics identified with a divine reason they also called god or Zeus; is Stoicism a religion explains that side. The other is human nature, and Epictetus spells out what it asks.
It is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man’s nature. For what is a man? The answer is, A rational and mortal being. Then by the rational faculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep; but if you do, in this case also the man is lost.
A human being, on this account, is “A rational and mortal being” (Discourses 2.9). In the lines that follow, Epictetus says that acting in a quarrelsome, harmful or violent way sinks you to the wild beast, and acting gluttonously, lewdly or rashly sinks you to the sheep. Either way you break “the promise of a man’s nature” (Discourses 2.9).
So living according to nature doesn’t mean returning to the woods or doing whatever comes easily. It means using your reason well and living as the social creature you are: thinking before you act, and acting for others as well as yourself. Marcus makes the same point on a morning when he would rather stay under the blankets: he tells himself he is getting up to do the work of a human being (Meditations 5.1, in our words).
Training
Self-examination
How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee,— "Never has wronged a man in deed or word." And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to endure, … and how many beautiful things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou hast despised; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.
Marcus’s review covers a whole life: how he has treated the people in it, and what he has come through. The daily version is Seneca’s. After the lamp is taken away, he goes over the whole day, hides nothing from himself, and acts as his own judge: he pardons himself this time and gives himself advice for next time (On Anger 3.36).
The aim is honest accounting, not self-punishment. The Evening Examination on this site turns Seneca’s habit into five short questions you can answer in a few minutes, and Stoic journaling covers keeping the answers.
Practice and progress
Every habit and faculty is maintained and increased by the corresponding actions: the habit of walking by walking, the habit of running by running. … Generally then if you would make anything a habit, do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something else in place of it. … If then you wish not to be of an angry temper, do not feed the habit: throw nothing on it which will increase it: at first keep quiet, and count the days on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion every day; now every second day; then every third, then every fourth.
Every habit grows by the actions that match it. To weaken one, stop feeding it and put something else in its place. Epictetus’s measure of progress is modest and countable: “count the days on which you have not been angry” (Discourses 2.18). Fewer bad days is progress, even if none of them is perfect.
Recall the passage on indifferents above: anyone can recite the doctrine. These two principles are the answer to that problem. You learn Stoicism the way you learn an instrument, by doing a little most days, and you check your progress at night. That is why the Stoic texts are full of exercises, and why a Stoic daily routine matters more than any single book.
From principle to practice
Each principle has a practice that trains it and situations that test it. The practices are in the practice library; the situation guides apply the principles to particular problems.
| Principle | Practice that trains it | Where it is tested |
|---|---|---|
| Dichotomy of control | Dichotomy of control | Worry, things you can’t control |
| Objective judgment | Objective representation | Anger |
| Inner freedom | Dichotomy of control | Fear |
| Virtue is the only good | Four virtues | Failure and setbacks |
| Wisdom, courage, justice, temperance | Four virtues, premeditatio malorum, voluntary discomfort | Fear |
| Shared humanity | View from above | Difficult people |
| Roles and duties | Morning preparation | Procrastination |
| The present moment | Memento mori | Worry |
| Change and impermanence | Negative visualization | Grief |
| Memento mori | Memento mori, memento mori calendar | Procrastination |
| Amor fati | Amor fati | Things you can’t control, failure |
| Living according to nature | Morning preparation | Emotions |
| Self-examination | Evening Examination | Every evening; see Stoic journaling |
| Practice and progress | A Stoic daily routine | Anger, procrastination |
Three of these practices are free in the app and on this site: the dichotomy of control, the four virtues and the Evening Examination. The other practices have original guides here; in the app, their guided versions are part of Premium.
Questions
What are the main principles of Stoicism?
How many Stoic principles are there?
What does 'virtue is the only good' mean?
What does 'living according to nature' mean?
Which Stoic principle is the most important?
Are the Stoic principles the same as the four virtues?
Sources and translations
- Epictetus, Enchiridion, translated by George Long (1877). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, translated by George Long (1862). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
- Seneca, On the Happy Life, translated by Aubrey Stewart (1889). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
- Epictetus, Discourses, translated by George Long (1877). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
Every quotation is checked word for word against these texts. How we source the Stoics.
Last reviewed October 5, 2026 · Report an error
IV · Repeat
Learn them by practicing them.
Stoic Practice pairs a morning teaching with exercises for hard moments and an evening review, free to download, with no account and your journal kept on your iPhone.
365 daily teachings · 12 guided exercises · 12 practices · Your journal stays on your iPhone
The daily practice is free. Premium adds the full guided sequence, all exercises and practices, and the archive: $6.99/month or $39.99/year (U.S.). No trial, no ads.