The library · Virtues
Temperance, the Stoic virtue of knowing what is enough
The short answer
Temperance is the Stoic virtue of right measure: knowing how much is enough of food, drink, possessions, pleasure and talk, and stopping there without resentment. The Stoics didn’t call pleasure evil. They counted it as neither good nor bad, and asked that you use it rather than let it use you.
In this guide · 4 sections
Of the four Stoic virtues, temperance is the one you get to practice most often. Few days ask for great courage, but every day has meals, purchases, screens and conversations, and each of them has a point past which more stops helping. This page gathers what Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius and Musonius Rufus said about that point, each passage in a public-domain translation or, for Musonius, a labeled paraphrase. For how temperance fits with wisdom, courage and justice, see the four virtues.
What temperance is
The Greek word is sōphrosynē, built from the words for “sound” and “mind.” The Romans said temperantia, and older English translations use temperance, moderation and self-control almost interchangeably. The Stoics defined every virtue as a kind of knowledge. Courage knows what should be endured; temperance knows what is worth choosing, and so what is worth passing up (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). They divided it into good discipline, seemliness, modesty and self-control (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)).
The measure itself comes from need. Seneca wrote the next passage from exile on Corsica, to his mother, who was grieving for him. He wanted her to know he lacked nothing that mattered.
Indeed, how very little is required to keep a man alive? and who, that has any virtue whatever, will find this fail him? … the wants of the body are few: it wants protection from the cold, and the means of allaying hunger and thirst: all desires beyond these are vices, not necessities. … Food is to be found everywhere, and has been placed by Nature in every part the world, but they pass it by as though they were blind … Nothing is sufficient for covetous desire, but Nature can be satisfied even with scant measure.
The body’s list is short: warmth, food, water. Seneca’s verdict on everything else is blunt: “all desires beyond these are vices, not necessities,” and “Nothing is sufficient for covetous desire” (Consolation to Helvia 10). Put in practical terms, that is temperance: you let need set the limit, because appetite never will. It doesn’t mean living on the minimum. It means knowing where the minimum is, so that everything above it is a choice you make rather than a hunger you serve.
In the next chapter he explains why appetite can’t set the limit.
Nor does this take place only with regard to money and food, but every want which is caused by vice and not by necessity is of this nature: however much you supply it with you do not quench it but intensify it. He who restrains himself within the limits prescribed by nature, will not feel poverty; he who exceeds them will always be poor, however great his wealth may be. Even a place of exile suffices to provide one with necessaries; whole kingdoms do not suffice to provide one with superfluities. It is the mind which makes men rich …
Seneca’s test is what happens when a want is supplied. Hunger ends with a meal. The wish for a nicer car doesn’t end with the nicer car; within a year it has found the next one. If feeding a want makes it louder, you know which kind it is. Whoever keeps within nature’s limits “will not feel poverty,” Seneca says, and whoever doesn’t “will always be poor, however great his wealth may be” (Consolation to Helvia 11). On the same salary, one person can feel rich and another poor, depending on what each thinks is necessary. The consolations guide summarizes the rest of the work.
What temperance is not
Temperance is easy to confuse with its neighbors. Three mix-ups are common.
It is not hostility to pleasure. The Stoics classed pleasure as an indifferent, like health and wealth: having it doesn’t make a life good, and lacking it doesn’t make a life bad (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)); the idea is set out in preferred indifferents. The word did double duty, though. As one of the passions, pleasure meant an irrational elation over something that seems worth choosing, and that the Stoics did count as a fault; its sound counterpart was joy (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). Seneca, arguing with an Epicurean, describes virtue as something that inspects pleasures before letting them in.
… virtue, which plucks a man by the ear, and measures the value of pleasures before she permits them to be used; nor does she set much store by those which she allows to pass current, for she merely allows their use, and her cheerfulness is not due to her use of them, but to her moderation in using them. … You devote yourself to pleasures, I check them; you indulge in pleasure, I use it …
“You indulge in pleasure, I use it” is the whole distinction. The Stoic eats the good dinner and enjoys it. What changes is where the good mood comes from, and Seneca puts it in the moderation rather than in the dinner. Marcus admired the same balance in his adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, who, in Marcus’s description, enjoyed comforts without fuss when he had them and didn’t miss them when he didn’t (Meditations 1.16).
It is not austerity for show. Going without can become a performance: the competitive fast, the cold plunge posted for an audience. Epictetus warns against exactly this in Enchiridion 47: if you live cheaply, don’t boast about it, and if you train yourself to endure hardship, keep it to yourself. Plain living done for an audience is about the audience. The guide to voluntary discomfort covers that kind of training.
It is not a temperament you are born with. Some people seem naturally moderate, and it is tempting to think you either have it or you don’t. Marcus disagreed. In a note to himself, he lists qualities that need no natural gift at all.
Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.—Be it so: but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not formed from them by nature. Show those qualities then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark?
Much of that list is temperance: “contentment with thy portion and with few things,” “no love of superfluity,” “freedom from trifling” (Meditations 5.5). Marcus does write “aversion to pleasure,” a sterner phrase than any of Seneca’s above. But read what frames the list: these qualities are “altogether in thy power,” with “no excuse of natural incapacity.” If you think of yourself as someone with no self-control, then by Marcus’s reasoning that is an excuse, not a description.
Temperance in the sources
The Stoics didn’t leave temperance abstract. They applied it to meals, clothes and houses, the body, conversation and pleasure itself.
Food and drink
Musonius Rufus, the Roman Stoic who taught Epictetus, gave lectures on food and on clothing and shelter. The standard English translations of his lectures are not in the public domain everywhere, so they appear here in the app’s labeled paraphrase.
Musonius teaches that self-control begins with food and drink, because these are things we face every day. He recommends simple, nourishing food, eaten in order to live rather than to indulge. An obsession with delicacies and a habit of gluttony are signs of a weak character. Because meals come around so often, eating becomes a daily practice ground for mastering oneself.
Musonius’s own advice on diet was strict: he favored cheap, readily available food such as fruit, vegetables, milk and cheese (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab)). You don’t need his menu to use his standard. Eating to live rather than to indulge can be checked at any meal by asking what job the food is doing. A sandwich at your desk can be lunch, or consolation for a bad meeting, or a way to put off the next task. Only the first is food doing its job, and nobody else needs to know which it was.
Clothes, houses and things
Musonius holds that clothing and houses exist to protect the body, not to display wealth. Simple, sturdy clothing and a modest dwelling are enough for that purpose. He also recommends growing used to a little cold and a little heat, since this makes a person stronger, whereas excessive comfort makes people soft and dependent on it.
The useful part is the test. Musonius judges clothes and houses by the job they do for the body, which gives a clear answer for a winter coat and a much less clear one for a fourth winter coat. Applied to a purchase, the test asks what the thing is for, and whether being seen with it is part of the answer. Marcus names simple living among the things he learned from his mother, in the first book of the Meditations.
From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.
Marcus grew up in a rich, well-connected family and became emperor, and he still counted a way of living “far removed from the habits of the rich” among his mother’s gifts.
The body
It is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things which concern the body, such as much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much easing of the body, much copulation. But these things should be done as subordinate things; and let all your care be directed to the mind.
Notice what Epictetus doesn’t say. Eating, drinking and exercise “should be done”; he isn’t asking anyone to neglect them. His complaint is about proportion. These things belong “as subordinate things,” serving a life rather than running it. When a weekend is planned around its meals, or a week’s mood rides on a workout streak, the order has flipped.
Speech
Restraint in talk counts too, and for many people it is harder than restraint at the table. The longest chapter of the Enchiridion is a list of rules for conduct, and much of it is about speaking.
And let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in few words. And rarely, and when the occasion calls, we shall say something; but about none of the common subjects, … and especially not about men, as blaming them or praising them, or comparing them. … Let not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive. … In company take care not to speak much and excessively about your own acts or dangers; for as it is pleasant to you to make mention of your own dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happened to you.
Read as rules, these sound stiff. Read as questions to ask before you speak, they are useful. Is this necessary? Is it about other people, and if so, is it blame, praise or a comparison? Am I telling this story for them or for me? The questions take a second, and they catch a good share of what you would later wish unsaid. Anyone who has sat through a colleague’s full account of marathon training knows why Epictetus included the last one, and so, probably, does anyone who has given one.
Pleasure and freedom
The Stoic case for temperance ends in freedom. Seneca again, from On the Happy Life:
Let virtue lead the way and bear the standard: we shall have pleasure for all that, but we shall be her masters and controllers; she may win some concessions from us, but will not force us to do anything. On the contrary, those who have permitted pleasure to lead the van, have neither one nor the other: for they lose virtue altogether, and yet they do not possess pleasure, but are possessed by it, and are either tortured by its absence or choked by its excess … nor does he buy pleasure for himself, but sells himself to pleasure.
The person who lets pleasure lead doesn’t end up with more of it. He is “tortured by its absence or choked by its excess,” owned by the thing he thought he owned, and in the end he “sells himself to pleasure” (On the Happy Life 14). That is the real argument. Pleasure isn’t the enemy; the trouble is that someone run by appetite has handed over something worth more, the ability to choose. Seneca’s own word for it, a few lines further on, is liberty.
How to practice temperance
Temperance is built in small decisions, so practice it in small decisions.
- Set the measure before the moment. Decide how much while you are calm: one glass, one episode, a fixed amount to spend this weekend. Seneca’s measure was need; yours can be a number chosen in advance, because the moment itself is a poor judge.
- Ask who it is for. Before a purchase, ask whether you would still want it if no one else ever saw it. If the honest answer is no, you have found the line.
- Use one meal a day as practice. Notice whether you are eating from hunger or from habit. You don’t have to change anything at first; Musonius treated the table as the place where self-command begins, and noticing comes before changing.
- Say less than you could. In one conversation today, say what is necessary and stop. Skip the comparison, the verdict on the absent colleague, the long story about yourself.
- Look back at night. The Evening Examination asks which virtues you practiced, with no score. Temperance is often the easiest to spot: the reply you didn’t send, the second helping you passed on, the laptop closed at a reasonable hour.
When a specific decision is in front of you, the free virtue check asks where restraint is needed alongside what wisdom, justice and courage ask of you.
Questions
What is temperance in Stoicism?
What does sophrosyne mean?
Did the Stoics think pleasure is bad?
Is Stoic temperance the same as abstinence?
What did Epictetus say about temperance?
How do you practice temperance?
Sources and translations
- Seneca, Consolation to Helvia, translated by Aubrey Stewart (1889). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
- Seneca, On the Happy Life, translated by Aubrey Stewart (1889). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, translated by George Long (1862). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
- Musonius Rufus, Lectures, quoted here only as an original paraphrase (labeled), because its common English translations are not in the public domain worldwide.
- Epictetus, Enchiridion, translated by George Long (1877). Project Gutenberg (opens in a new tab)
Every quotation is checked word for word against these texts. How we source the Stoics.
Last reviewed October 5, 2026 · Report an error
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